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times the lessons learned were small, 
such as the discovery that landing net 
rungs spaced too far apart posed a 
significant danger to debarking troops�
Some elements of the TORCH landings 
touch on current questions� For example, 
although the Saint-Nazaire and Dieppe 
raids had demonstrated previously the 
inherent difficulty in conducting an 
amphibious assault on built-up areas, 
TORCH would feature several efforts 
along these lines� The most dramatic of 
these was an attempt to land U�S� troops 
from HMS Walney and HMS Hartland 
(the former U�S� Coast Guard cutters 
Sebago and Pontchartrain, respectively) 
directly onto the moles of Oran Harbor� 
Both vessels quickly were identified as 
hostile and ran an intense gauntlet of 
French fire until sunk� In contrast, an 
attempt was made to sail USS Dallas, a 
vintage destroyer carrying seventy-five 
specially trained assault troops, six miles 
up Port Lyautey’s Wadi Sebou waterway 
to carry out an attack on a critically im-
portant all-weather airfield� The effort, 
despite experiencing significant delays, 
succeeded� In an ever-urbanizing world, 
the viability of direct amphibious as-
saults may be open to debate once again�
O’Hara rightfully points out that TORCH, 
in the main, failed to deliver hoped-for 
results� It would take five months to 
achieve victory in North Africa, not the 
three weeks anticipated� The operation 
did nothing to ease the plight of the 
Soviet Union and the Mediterranean 
remained contested waters� The African 
campaign drew men, matériel, and 
shipping away from efforts to support 
a direct invasion of Europe� TORCH 
resulted in the total occupation of 
France by Germany and the intentional 
scuttling of the French fleet at Toulon� 
None of these results, according to 
O’Hara, inflicted real loss on Italy and 
Germany� However, in the opportunity 
to identify and resolve amphibious 
challenges and as a beginning to the 
development of a truly combined 
strategic command, TORCH was of 
value� If, as O’Hara claims, TORCH also 
ensured that France would not become 
a true ally of Germany, the strategic 
benefit may have been significant�
TORCH sheds some welcome light on 
a campaign that too often is passed 
over� Scholars and lay readers alike will 
find the book useful� While O’Hara 
has performed yeoman service in 
providing this detailed account of the 
amphibious portion of the campaign, 
perhaps his greatest contribution 
is to restore the reputation of naval 
forces that, far from offering token 
resistance, fought with courage and 
tenacity, often against superior odds�
RICHARD J� NORTON
How the War Was Won: Air-Sea Power and Al-
lied Victory in World War II, by Phillips Payson 
O’Brien� Cambridge, U�K�: Cambridge Univ� 
Press, 2015� 640 pages� $35�
This book provides a detailed reexami-
nation of the main contributory factors 
leading to Allied victory in World War 
II� In many ways the book’s argument
is not so much new as it is a revision
of the revisionists� During the Cold
War the narrative was largely that the
Western Allies had triumphed over
Germany and Japan with some help
from the Soviet Union� That narrative
was challenged at the time, and with
more success after the end of the Cold
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War by revisionist historians who 
placed an increased emphasis on the 
role of Soviet ground and air forces in 
the defeat of Germany. The Russian 
front, it was argued, was where the 
bulk of Germany’s forces was engaged 
and, as far as the revisionist narrative 
went, defeated by the Soviet Union. Dr. 
O’Brien, a reader at the University of 
Glasgow, challenges that argument with 
a wealth of data and looks at the war in 
more global terms. He argues that the air 
and sea forces of the United States and 
the British Empire played the decisive 
role by preventing “the Germans and 
Japanese from moving” (p. 16).
How the War Was Won provides a broad 
array of detailed information discussing 
the enormous industrial contribution 
of all sides. Indeed, the author’s analysis 
of all this information makes a compel-
ling case for his argument. Yet there is 
something missing: it is difficult to see 
the link between cause and effect. One 
can see such a link better regarding the 
war against Japan, but in the case of the 
war in Europe the author does not show 
clearly the link he claims between air 
and sea power causing immense damage 
to Germany’s war economy and Soviet 
troops wandering around Berlin in 1945. 
I suspect that the Soviet forces’ killing 
and wounding of millions of German 
combat troops might have something to 
do with this, for without the physical re-
moval of German soldiers from the Sovi-
et Union’s route to Berlin Hitler might 
not have felt the need to commit suicide.
Now, there is no denying that Allied 
air and sea power contributed to Allied 
victory in Europe; the argument seems 
to be to what extent they did so. Thus, 
this book is welcome for the depth of 
detail it provides as fodder for such a 
debate. That this reviewer is not entirely 
convinced of the author’s arguments 
does not make this a bad book; it is in 
fact a very good book, and an extremely 
welcome addition to the literature on 
World War II. It provides an enormous 
amount of information and analysis 
about the role of air and sea power, 
which furthers our understanding of 
the reasons for Allied success. That it 
causes the questioning of the current 
orthodoxy is to be applauded, as 
greater understanding often results 
from challenges to the status quo.
This book should prove of great benefit 
to advanced students of World War 
II, and it is particularly pertinent for 
specialists interested in current U.S. 
national security needs. Given the 
friction that exists among the United 
States, China, and Russia, the book 
provides an opportunity to think about 
how the U.S. armed services should 
structure their forces for any future 
conflict with these potential adversaries. 
Dr. O’Brien’s book should be read by 
any sailor, marine, or airman invested 
in a budget fight, because “the only way 
to ‘win’ a war is to stop your enemy 
from moving” (p. 488). That argument 
seems a particularly pertinent one when 
looking at the problems of Southeast 
Asia or the Baltic or Black Sea regions.
NICHOLAS MURRAY
A Military History of Japan: From the Age of the 
Samurai to the 21st Century, by John T. Kuehn. 
Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2014. 299 pages. $75.
Japan is at an inflection point. Depend-
ing on how particular peoples and 
nations view this enigmatic country, it 
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